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HATE SPEECH LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 
THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH. By Jeremy Waldron.1 
Harvard University Press. 2012. Pp. vii + 292. $26.95 
(cloth). 
James Allan2 
Jeremy Waldron is erudite, well-published and well-known. 
He currently divides his time between being a professor of law at 
the New York University School of Law in the United States 
and being a Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at 
All Souls College, Oxford University in the United Kingdom, 
though the latter of these posts is comparatively recent. And of 
course prior to both of these Waldron held full-time positions at 
Columbia and Berkeley law schools and outside the law school 
world at Princeton University and Edinburgh University. 
I mentioned above that Professor Waldron is well-published 
but putting it that way rather trivializes just how prolific and 
wide-ranging his writings have been. Waldron, a legal phil-
osopher and philosopher more generally, has written on the idea 
of private property in relation to claims about fundamental 
rights;3 he has written on the Rule of Law;4 he has attempted to 
make a case for greater receptivity by United States courts to 
consider overseas case law;5 he has delved into Kant’s legal 
thinking;6 he has had an on-going interest in thinking about and 
 
 1. University Professor, New York University School of Law; Chichele Professor 
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 2. Garrick Professor of Law, University of Queensland, Australia; Card visiting 
Professor of Law, University Of San Diego School of Law. The author wishes to thank 
Larry Alexander, Richard Ekins, Adam Hirsch, Grant Huscroft and Steven Smith for 
their comments on an earlier draft. And thanks, too, to Christen Somerville. 
 3. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988).  
 4. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept 
(in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137 (2002).  
 5. See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 129 (2005); but see my response and rejection of the Waldronian argument in 
James Allan, Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s Stone, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133 
(2008) [hereinafter Allan, Philosopher’s Stone]. 
 6. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535 
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analyzing rights;7 and he has written on torture,8 to give just a 
sampling of the scope of Waldron’s interests. 
That said, it seems to me that Jeremy Waldron is best 
known9 for his work on strong judicial review of the American 
sort that empowers unelected top judges to gainsay the elected 
legislature, indeed to strike down and invalidate the statutes 
produced by these law-makers. Waldron is against giving this 
power to the judiciary10 though his opposition to this counter-
majoritarian practice appears latterly to have become more 
hedged about with qualifications, conditional premises and 
exceptions,11 or so it appears to me.12 
Whether you agree with that “this is what Waldron is best 
known for” claim of mine, or not, remember it because it will 
make a cameo reappearance below. Indeed, it will form one 
ancillary plank of my argument that Waldron’s underlying thesis 
in his most recent book is ultimately unpersuasive and 
unsatisfying. 
I refer to Jeremy Waldron’s The Harm in Hate Speech, a 
consideration of which will take up the rest of this review. In 
Part A I will briefly introduce the book, outline its contents and 
sketch Waldron’s thesis and arguments. Then in Part B I will say 
why I think that Waldron fails in this book, by which I mean that 
he fails in the end to offer up a convincing, persuasive and 
satisfying argument for his ultimate position. Of course Waldron 
certainly does not fail in being interesting, erudite, informative 
and, at times, (my favorite) provocative. 
 
(1996). 
 7. This starts as far back as Waldron’s introduction to (and editorship of) 
THEORIES OF RIGHTS (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). 
 8. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the 
White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005).  
 9. See Allan, Philosopher’s Stone, supra note 5. 
 10. For a chronological sampling, see Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of 
Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (1993), Jeremy Waldron, 
Freeman’s Defense of Judicial Review, 13 L. & PHIL. 27 (1994), JEREMY WALDRON, LAW 
AND DISAGREEMENT (1999), and Jeremy Waldron, Eisgruber’s House of Lords, 37 
U.S.F. L. REV. 89 (2002). 
 11. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE 
L.J. 1346 (2006). 
 12. Indeed I have alluded to this, and to how Waldron’s normative case against 
giving judges over much moral input at the point-of-application does not seem to carry 
over into Waldron’s preferred theory of constitutional interpretation—or to his view of 
statutory bills of rights. See Allan, Philosopher’s Stone, supra note 5; See also James 
Allan, Fantastic Mr. Fox—A Review of Brian Simpson’s “Reflections on ‘The Concept of 
Law,’” 23 KING’S L.J. 331, 337 (2012). 
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PART A—INTRODUCING THE BOOK AND ITS 
CONTENTS 
The Harm in Hate Speech was published in 2012. As 
Waldron himself makes clear in chapter one, the book’s genesis 
lay in a review Waldron wrote for the New York Review of 
Books of a book by Anthony Lewis on the topic of free speech.13 
It was the response to that review, at least in part, that Waldron 
tells us in his introductory first chapter that prompted him to 
flesh out that Lewis review into this book, The Harm in Hate 
Speech. 
So in chapter two Waldron gives us an expanded version of 
that Lewis review of his. Then in chapters three and four we get 
Waldron’s positive case, the most favorable account or defense 
of hate speech laws he can give. Chapter five deals largely with 
needed distinctions, complexities and qualifications, including 
the distinction crucial to his argument—the one distinguishing 
between offending people and attacking their dignity. Waldron, 
as you might suspect, does not think laws that regulate hate 
speech ought to extend to protecting against felt offense whereas 
they should, thinks Waldron, cover dignity-degrading or dignity-
enervating hateful words. And of course Waldron argues that he 
can uphold this distinction; that the latter (dignity protection) 
need not, even in the hurly burly of real-life regulation, regularly 
and consistently end up being used merely to prevent or 
foreclose speech that causes offense. 
Chapters six and seven are defensive in nature. They can be 
thought of as pre-emptive replies or counter-arguments to the 
anti-hate speech laws positions firstly of C. Edwin Baker 
(chapter six) and secondly of Ronald Dworkin (chapter seven). 
The last chapter of the book, chapter eight, then turns to history. 
Here Waldron attempts to draw a link between the modern 
debate over hate speech laws and the Enlightenment concern 
with religious toleration, Waldron arguing that the two are, or at 
least can be understood to be, connected. 
If that is a bare outline of the structure of the book, let me 
now turn to the gist of Waldron’s argument in The Harm in Hate 
Speech. 
First off, I need to make it abundantly clear that Waldron 
does not offer up an argument about American First 
 
 13. ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A 
BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2007). 
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Amendment jurisprudence: “Still less is it my aim to make a case 
for the constitutional acceptability of [hate speech] laws in the 
United States” (p.11, but see also p. 103, inter alia), he says. Of 
course there are occasional asides about how the existing U.S. 
case law may, just, leave scope for some sort of constitutionally 
valid hate speech laws (see p.28 ff, inter alia). But more than 
once Waldron concedes that “. . . it is unlikely that [anti-hate 
speech] legislation . . . will ever pass constitutional muster in 
America” (p.11). 
So it is not that sort of parsing-of-precedents book, nor even 
a “here’s what a return to first principles constitutional 
interpretation of the sort I advocate could achieve” one. No, 
Waldron eschews all that. This book, instead, aims to “come to 
terms with the best that can be said for hate speech regulations” 
(p.11). It aims to make a plausible or maybe even persuasive 
case in favor of hate speech laws. This will involve offering the 
most defensible characterization of these laws that Waldron can. 
And at core what Waldron does is to offer what amounts to 
a consequentialist argument to that effect. When you throw 
everything into the balance, the real harm that vilifying and 
humiliating vulnerable groups does will, on occasion, outweigh 
the costs that come from using the law to silence people, even in 
some instances when the hateful words are not inciting or 
provoking violence. That is the gist of the Waldronian case. 
Along the way, of course, Waldron needs to tell us what for 
him falls under the aegis of “hate speech.” And in different ways 
and in different places in the book he does. It is publications 
(because Waldron is far more concerned with the written word 
that is lasting rather than the spoken word that is ephemeral) 
“which express profound disrespect, hatred, and vilification for 
members of minority groups” (p. 27); it is a species of “group 
defamation” or “group libel” claim (see pp. 39–41, inter alia); it 
is “assaults upon the dignity of the persons affected” (p. 59); “[i]t 
is a matter of status—one’s status as a member of society in good 
standing” (p. 60); and so the point is “that hate speech laws 
really are enacted for the benefit of vulnerable racial, ethnic, and 
religious minorities, to uphold their reputation and their dignity” 
(p. 203). 
As you can see from those few selected passages, the 
concept of “dignity” plays a large role in Waldron’s argument. 
Hence Waldron spends no small amount of time explaining that 
“dignity is a complex idea” (p. 59), but at its core it refers to 
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people’s “basic social standing, the basis of their recognition as 
social equals and as bearers of human rights and constitutional 
entitlements” (p. 59). 
The real, tangible harm of hate speech, says Waldron, is its 
“radical denigration of status and [its] undermining of [the] 
assurance [of decent treatment and respect]” (p. 108). And so 
the legislating against hate speech can also be understood in 
terms of “public order” (p. 53) benefits or the goal of “a well-
ordered society” (pp. 77–78). And in making the best case he can 
for some regulation or outlawing of hate speech Waldron has 
various other quivers in his bow. He makes an analogy to 
arguments seeking laws against pornography (pp. 89–92, inter 
alia); he puts weight on practices in other democratic countries 
(pp. 13, 40, 57–58, 149, inter alia); as mentioned already, he 
distinguishes undermining dignity from causing offense (much of 
chapter five); and he takes on, preemptively, two well-known 
thinkers who dislike speech regulation (chapters six and seven). 
As I hope I have made clear already, The Harm in Hate 
Speech offers a nuanced and erudite case for us to think again 
about the desirability of hate speech laws. That said, Waldron’s 
argument ultimately fails, in my opinion; it is unpersuasive and 
unconvincing, on the grounds I now set out. 
PART B—WHY WALDRON’S ARGUMENT FAILS 
As Waldron starts his book with a sort of confessional 
account of why he came to write this book, let me also lay my 
cards on the table. You see, unlike many readers, I am broadly 
in the Waldron camp in disliking bills of rights and strong 
judicial review, on democratic grounds.14 So the critique that 
follows of Waldron’s “best case for hate speech laws” will take 
 
 14. See, e.g., James Allan, Bills of Rights and Judicial Power—A Liberal’s 
Quandary 16 OXFORD J.LEGAL STUD. 337 (1996); see also JAMES ALLAN, SYMPATHY 
AND ANTIPATHY: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL (2002); James Allan, Rights, 
Paternalism, Constitutions and Judges, in LITIGATING RIGHTS: PERSPECTIVES FROM 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (Grant Huscroft & Paul Rishworth eds., 
2002); James Allan, Oh That I Were Made Judge in the Land, 30 FED. L. REV. 561 (2002); 
James Allan, A Modest Proposal, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 197 (2003); James Allan, 
An Unashamed Majoritarian, 27 DALHOUSIE L.J. 537 (2004); James Allan & Grant 
Huscroft, Rights Internationalism Coming Home to Roost? 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 
(2006); James Allan, Portia, Bassanio or Dick the Butcher? Constraining Judges in the 
Twenty-First Century, 17 KINGS’S L.J. 1 (2006); James Allan, Thin Beats Fat Yet Again—
Conceptions of Democracy, 25 L. & PHIL. 533 (2006); Allan, Philosopher’s Stone, supra 
note 5; James Allan, Meagher’s Mischaracterisations of Majoritarianism, 20 KING’S L.J. 
115 (2009); JAMES ALLAN, THE VANTAGE OF LAW: ITS ROLE IN THINKING ABOUT 
LAW, JUDGING AND BILLS OF RIGHTS (2011). 
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place on Waldron’s home turf, as it were. It will not be a “the 
judges should have done X, Y or Z” type critique that points to 
some supposed lack of understanding of the First Amendment 
case law. Instead, I want to point out weaknesses in the 
Waldronian argument taken on its own terms. And I turn to do 
that now, under the following five headings. 
1) WHAT REALLY IS THE UNDERLYING NATURE OF 
WALDRON’S ARGUMENT? 
I said above that Waldron offers a consequentialist argu-
ment that tries to make the best case it can in favor of hate 
speech laws. And I was careful to put it in those terms because 
here and there Waldron says such things as “my aim is not 
directly to advocate hate speech laws in the United States” (p. 
103, and see p. 11). On the other hand, there are times when 
Waldron does, in fact, seem to be arguing in favor of hate speech 
laws. When talking of vulnerable minorities and the hurt hateful 
speech can cause them he says that “[w]e don’t have to dissect 
any of this and present it in a pure form in order to understand 
the wrongness of hate speech and the wisdom of legislating against 
it” (p. 114, emphasis added). Or when telling us how he is using 
the concept of dignity, Waldron says that he “used it in the 
course of making an argument about the desirability of certain 
legislation” (p. 138). 
So, in fact, it is not at all clear in this book whether 
Waldron’s aim is actually to support the enactment of some 
variety or other of hate speech laws, even in the United States, 
or whether it is something much woolier and more in the nature 
of a Harvard Law School seminar discussion, with Waldron 
pointing out that much more can be said on the other side of the 
argument than most others suppose, or maybe just plain out 
playing Devil’s advocate. 
Readers will have to decide for themselves which it is 
Waldron really wishes to do. For my part, I would have 
preferred the book had it been the case that Waldron had just 
stated plainly that he was arguing in favor of a limited variety of 
hate speech laws. And I would have preferred that not because 
my guess is that that is in fact Waldron’s position (though that is 
my guess) or that the equivocation is slightly grating (though it 
is), but rather because it would have forced Waldron to be more 
specific as to just what he wanted. And that might have either 
bolstered his case, or shown up a few weaknesses. 
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For instance, at no point in the entire book does Waldron 
give us a draft hate speech law that he would endorse. You don’t 
really need to do that when you’re making the Harvard Law 
School seminar best-case-you-can for such laws. You can point 
to various bits of overseas legislation (as Waldron regularly 
does), and when pushed say that these “are something for 
legislators to consider” (p. 173, also pp. 176–77). 
But if you are in fact arguing for some sort of limited hate 
speech laws—arguing that these are a good idea—then it seems 
to me that you need to tell us what they will look like, or at least 
sketch an outline. Merely pointing overseas, as I shall argue 
below, has problems of its own, including the dangers of cherry-
picking, and of failing to distinguish between criminal and non-
criminal hate speech law regimes. 
I also said above that Waldron’s argument is in essence a 
consequentialist one. Yes, at times in discussing the concept of 
dignity the argument briefly moves to more Kantian footings. 
But that is not Waldron’s ultimate aim in this book. Here he 
wants dignity to be understood in more down-to-earth terms and 
he most definitely wants the reader to see, and to acknowledge, 
that hateful, vilifying speech has clear bad consequences. 
And surely Waldron is correct about that. And yet as 
consequentialist arguments go there is undoubtedly more to be 
thrown in the balance than the many harms of hateful speech 
that Waldron notes. I am not here referring to Dworkin’s claim 
that the bad consequences claims made by hate speech laws’ 
proponents are inflated (pp. 176, 183). Take them to be every bit 
as bad as Waldron suggests. Nevertheless, that is surely not the 
end of any robust consequentialist weighing up of costs and 
benefits. We might also like to consider such other things as how 
over-inclusive such hate speech laws might prove to be (see 
below); what the knock-on effects will be on a judiciary asked to 
decide if speech has “humiliated or terrorized” (p. 84) 
individuals in particular groups; what the costs of putting in jail 
those not cowed by these laws might be (see below as regards 
Canada); and I would have thought we might also like some sort 
of comparative analysis of where the vulnerable groups Waldron 
focuses upon, say Muslims, do better or worse today—right 
now—in terms of being included-in-society, members-in-good-
standing, dignity-bearing citizens. Is it in the U.S. without hate 
speech laws or is it in the U.K. or Germany or France or the 
countries with hate speech laws that Waldron repeatedly refers 
to? 
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You see it is far from clear to me that the answer to that 
question is not already the U.S., the lack of hate speech laws 
notwithstanding. And if that is correct, or even almost correct 
(barring a Scandinavian country or two), then that might also 
affect one’s consequentialist calculation of the need for hate 
speech laws—if much of what you want them for is already 
better achieved here than in places that have them, and we 
recognize that such laws will carry bad consequences, as well as 
potential dignity-enhancing ones. 
Instead Waldron merely makes rather brief mention of the 
potential dangers of these hate speech laws in terms of their 
possibly fostering identity politics (p. 131), or their undermining 
the need in society for a certain degree of having a thick skin (p. 
126). 
But for me, at least, it was an unsatisfying sort of 
consequentialist case that Waldron makes in favor of hate 
speech laws—assuming, of course, that he is wanting to make 
that case and not just seeking to raise our awareness that more 
can be said on the other side of this debate. 
2) JUST PRECISELY HOW DO HATE SPEECH LAWS BOOST 
DIGNITY? 
At its very core, Waldron’s argument is that properly 
designed and limited hate speech laws can boost the dignity of 
vulnerable minority groups by stopping or reducing attempts to 
undermine the assurance society makes to them that they have 
the status of being members “in good standing.” 
But a very big question is just how do hate speech laws do 
that? How do they boost dignity? Or put the other way round, 
how does hate speech itself undermine this assurance? 
And as far as I could tell, Waldron never really makes it 
clear how exactly he thinks hate speech undermines this 
assurance of good standing and how laws against such speech 
themselves undermine that undermining.15 
There are three things Waldron could have said in reply. 
One possible reply would be that hate speech attacks dignity and 
undermines the assurance of good standing in society by 
conveying information to its target groups. This speech that is 
 
 15. The next two points I make are in part the fruit of an interesting conversation I 
had on this with Larry Alexander. 
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hostile to and contemptuous of them gives them information 
about the feelings and views and attitudes of the speakers. 
On this first mooted Waldronian reply, what hate speech 
laws do to boost dignity is to suppress this information. The 
target groups then do not get to find out what the hate speakers 
think of them. And this delivers to such target groups a certain 
sense of security, but it is not a reliable sense of security. It might 
even be a false sense of security. And that is because the hate 
speech laws do not change or lessen the attitudes and beliefs of 
the people cowed by these laws into silence; rather these laws 
simply keep the target groups from learning about the existence 
of these attitudes. 
There are very few hints of this sort of answer to the ‘how 
do hate speech laws boost dignity?’ question in The Harm in 
Hate Speech.16 And that is surely because such a “willful 
blindness is better than knowing the truth” rationale for 
supporting hate speech laws is so weak and unpersuasive. 
A second possible reply by Waldron—one that is much 
more likely that he had in mind—is that hate speech undermines 
the assurance of good standing by its effects on listeners outside 
the target group. It persuades some of them. It changes their 
opinions. The hate multiplies. 
And that fear is surely a possibility and one whose 
likelihood and bad effects need to be thrown into the 
consequentialist hopper or ledger when assessing the desirability 
of hate speech laws. Indeed Waldron alludes to this second 
possible reply in terms of hate speech being a signaling to others 
tool and a focal point for proliferation (see, inter alia, pp. 94–95). 
So by stamping out or reducing hate speech by the sanctions 
attached to law you prevent the proliferation and so boost—or, 
perhaps more accurately, do not further diminish—dignity. 
Yet there are real problems with this second mooted reply 
as to how precisely it is that hate speech undermines the 
assurance to vulnerable groups of their being members of society 
in good standing. One very obvious difficulty with this second 
mooted basis for claiming that hate speech laws can boost 
dignity of some people in vulnerable groups is that it requires 
you to take a very dim and pessimistic view as to the capabilities 
 
 16. But see p. 95 (“It is sometimes objected that such laws simply drive hate speech 
underground. But in a way, that is the whole point . . . .”). 
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and capacities of your fellow citizens. Indeed Waldron concedes 
that this is precisely the case (p. 153). 
Now it may well be that many people, not least in the 
Harvard Law School faculty lounge, think such pessimism is 
more than warranted when it comes to “the first 200 names in 
the Boston phone book.”17 I do not share that pessimistic view. 
But many might and some of them may be prepared to argue for 
the truth of such pessimism. And to the extent they were 
convincing, then to that same extent would this second mooted 
reply gain in plausibility. 
Of course whatever your view on the underlying merits of 
the pessimist’s case as regards the foibles and weaknesses of 
one’s fellow citizens and their inabilities to see through the 
rantings of Nazis (pp. 94, 95, 226), of cross-burners and KKK 
members (pp. 77, 81, 94, 102, 113), of Holocaust deriders (p. 102) 
and of those peddling homophobic abuse (pp. 116 ff), it seems 
that Waldron himself is in a particularly difficult position in 
running this line. After all, the Waldron of days gone by (and 
recall that I agree with that early Waldron) argued against over-
powerful judges and opposed strong judicial review precisely on 
the basis that much disagreement in society, including 
disagreements about fundamental and hotly contested issues 
understood in terms of rights, were best seen as reasonable 
disagreements.18 Put more bluntly, the early Waldron is nothing 
if not optimistic about the capacities of his fellow citizens. 
Now, I will return below to this question about whether the 
core arguments in this book are easily made by a Jeremy 
Waldron who wishes to remain consistent with his earlier 
positions and views, but for now just note the potential difficulty 
for Waldron (as opposed to others with a long-standing 
pessimism about the capabilities of regular voters and citizens). 
And consider, too, whether it helps Waldron to lay the blame for 
this distrust (p. 153) at the feet of real-life legislators who opt to 
enact these hate speech laws. There might be scope for the 
“best-case-I-can-make” Waldron to finesse the issue in those 
terms. But a Waldron who wanted, in fact, to argue for the 
enactment of hate speech laws would need to tell us what he 
thinks about the capacities of his fellow citizens and whether he 
 
 17. See WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BILL:  THE 
BEST OF WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR. 117–18 (1970) (quoting WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., 
RUMBLES LEFT AND RIGHT: A BOOK ABOUT TROUBLESOME PEOPLE AND IDEAS 134–
35 (1963)). 
 18. See supra, note 10. 
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thinks we ought to be pessimistic or optimistic on that score of 
the ability of Joe Average Citizen to withstand and see through 
the rantings of Holocaust denying neo-Nazis. (And if it be the 
latter, that Waldron is himself optimistic about his fellow 
citizens’ capacities, then for Waldron this second mooted reply 
loses most of its force). 
On top of that, there are problems with this second mooted 
reply that apply to anyone offering it up as a ground for thinking 
that hate speech undermines the assurance of good standing and 
that hate speech laws can fix that to some extent (and so boost 
dignity). 
Here the main difficulty with the “fear of these ideas 
proliferating” defense of hate speech laws is that it works so 
much better if you simply assume all such speech is false. What if 
you worry, though, that some small percentage of it is true? Or 
that you can’t be sure where to draw the line foreclosing false 
and true speech? In other words, what if you have real worries 
about how this will all play out in the real world and that any 
hate speech regime—any set of laws Waldron himself can 
articulate—will end up being over-inclusive (and no doubt 
under-inclusive too)? 
It seems to me that these are very deep and concerning 
waters indeed, this issue of what speech will be ruled out for its 
hateful and dignity-diminishing nature that may in fact turn out 
to be true speech or end up indirectly pushing others to see the 
truth. Worse, it also strikes me that Waldron fudges or finesses 
this issue in the book. 
For instance, Waldron includes under the aegis of hate 
speech those publications not just directed at race but those 
directed also at religion. Indeed on the very first page of the 
book he gives what the reader must assume is an example of 
hateful speech that the law ought to suppress by raising the 
hypothetical of a Muslim man out walking with his two young 
children who sees a sign saying “Muslims and 9/11! Don’t serve 
them, don’t speak to them, and don’t let them in” (p. 1). Yet this 
particular example of dignity-diminishing words directed at 
religion never really raises the truth issue (of a religion’s tenets, 
that is, not of its causal link to terrorism). So what if the sign had 
instead simply quoted Professor Richard Dawkins and read that 
Islam is “one of the great evils of the world”?19 Surely that is as 
 
 19. Dale Miller, “There’s no God and Islam is evil” speech earns Richard Dawkins 
ovation from islanders, THE SCOTSMAN, (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.scotsman.com/the-
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likely to affect the dignity of the children in the hypothetical, and 
of the father too. And all the more so coming from a world-
famous atheist. 
Would Waldron seek to outlaw that? I suspect not. But 
Waldron’s attempts to explain which talk about other religions is 
okay, and which not, never really make clear how you 
distinguish these two. Indeed, for me, there is a tad too much of 
what Waldron himself in other contexts terms “happy talk” 
about how we all ought to be sensitive to others’ religious beliefs 
and such things. But of course many people are not. And what 
you are advocating with hate speech laws, at the end of the day, 
is attempting to silence people through threats, big fines and yes, 
putting them in jail. (See below as regards to Canada.) 
So anyone offering up this second mooted reply about how 
hate speech can dangerously persuade others needs to tell us 
more than Waldron does about how and when we can be sure 
that speech about, say, religion is clearly false. Or failing that, he 
or she would need to come out of the closet and assert that no 
religion or religious tenets can ever lawfully be disparaged 
(which, to be clear, is not Waldron’s position, it is just that things 
may move that way in practice if Waldron cannot specify what 
his position is).20 Accordingly, I do not find this second possible 
reply to the question of how hate speech laws will boost dignity 
all that much more persuasive than the first one. 
That leaves a third and final possible reply as to how this 
might come about, how hate speech laws can reduce attempts to 
undermine the assurance to people in vulnerable groups of their 
being in good standing in society. And here we turn from how 
hate speech can persuade others (the focus of the second mooted 
reply) to how its outlawing and criminalization might affect the 
speaker. Maybe such laws will, after all, change the vile views 
and attitudes of some of these speakers? 
Certainly Waldron himself never relies on this possibility. 
Indeed he is abundantly clear that it is not his aim, through hate 
speech laws, to change anyone’s beliefs. The issue does get an 
airing in the book’s final chapter, but this is clearly a very weak 
basis on which to rest any justification for hate speech laws, and 
 
scotsman/scotland/there-s-no-god-and-islam-is-evil-speech-earns-richard-dawkins-
ovation-from-islanders-1-2612951. 
 20. And linked to this criticism is the one I make below about Waldron’s overseas 
cherry-picking and focusing only on criminal law hate speech provisions (as in Canada 
with the Keegstra case) rather than on the vastly more used civil law sanctions, where 
truth is not a defense. 
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Waldron rests nothing on it. So I merely mention it as a 
possibility here because it might be that you could combine 
aspects of this third mooted possibility with bits of the above 
second one to hint at an argument in terms of politeness and 
socialization being how hate speech laws might achieve the 
bolstering of dignity. 
This combined sort of possibility might go like this: Lots of 
people, and maybe everyone, will have nasty or mean-spirited 
tendencies, and socialization involves teaching people to 
overcome and control these, instilling in us a sense of what “is 
done” and what “just isn’t done”—of what is “normal” in the 
sense of both usual and normative. So if we know that something 
“isn’t done,” we may still have desires to do it, but we come to 
think that we should try to control these desires. Likewise (sort 
of, maybe), if a hateful thing is said, the very saying of it tends to 
normalize it, and if the thing is said under permission, the 
normalization is stronger. So just as with parents teaching 
children the basic etiquette of politeness, hate speech laws effect 
a type of socialization process of what is and is not acceptable 
speech, and even attitudes. So maybe that sort of hybrid of 
possibilities two and three process is how we are to think that 
hate speech laws will boost dignity? 
Alas, even this last wholly speculative hybrid possibility of 
mine21 seems implausible. At core it is an argument about 
changing speakers’ views and beliefs and still strikes me as a 
poor candidate even when spiced up with bits of the second 
possibility. 
 So as far as trying to understand just how hate speech laws 
might boost dignity and how hate speech itself might undermine 
Waldron’s goal of assuring all and sundry that they have the 
status of being members of society “in good standing”—the 
quite hard to pin down how this might all work claims—these 
were the only three and a half possibilities I could come up with. 
And none, alone or together, is overly persuasive. 
3) IS WALDRON CHERRY-PICKING? 
Part of Jeremy Waldron’s argument in this book, quite a 
large part in fact, involves pointing to all sorts of other 
democratic jurisdictions, noting that they have hate speech laws, 
 
 21. In an earlier form it was first mooted by Steven Smith in a discussion I had with 
him. 
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and asking you to consider if—at least in this instance—
American exceptionalism is a good idea or a better than even 
bet. So Waldron makes repeated references to the United 
Kingdom and its Public Order Act, and to Canada and the top 
court’s decision there in R. v Keegstra,22 and to Australia, and to 
his native New Zealand, and more. 
But if we take two of those jurisdictions that I know 
passingly well, then it seems to me that Waldron leaves himself 
open to the charge that he has cherry-picked his examples. Start 
with Canada. Waldron refers to the Keegstra case, a more than 
two decades old Supreme Court of Canada decision, in four 
separate parts of the book. And it certainly is an important and 
leading decision that upheld the constitutionality of criminal 
hate speech laws in Canada against attack on the Charter of 
Rights’ freedom of expression grounds. 
Yet in Canada, or so it seems to me, the criminal law plays a 
small to insignificant role in the government’s attempt to 
suppress hate speech. Most of the action, nay the vast 
preponderance of the action, takes place in administrative 
tribunals where truth is not even a defense, where complainants 
have all of their costs picked up by the taxpayer but the accused 
do not, and where penalties include five-figure fines and (I mean 
this seriously) tribunal-backed-by-the-court orders never to 
speak on certain matters again.23 
It was in this non-criminal law realm that political 
commentator Mark Steyn was ensnared when the biggest selling 
Canadian news weekly magazine (largely considered to be 
mildly on the left-of-center of Canadian politics, if that matters 
to you) published an article that was an excerpt of a chapter of 
Steyn’s New York Times Number One best seller, America 
Alone. And in that article (and chapter, and book), Steyn 
pointed to unchallenged demographic trends related to high 
birthrates for Muslims but not for others and expressed grave 
concerns about their political, social and cultural implications. 
Steyn and that news magazine McLeans were accused of 
hate speech and dragged before three separate jurisdictions’ 
tribunals, the Ontario Human Rights Commission, the British 
Columbia Human Rights Commission and the Canadian Human 
Rights Commission, by a serial complainant, an official of the 
 
 22. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.). 
 23. See Lund v. Boissoin, 2008 AHRC 6 (Can.), rev’d, Lund v. Boissoin, 2012 
ABCA 300 (Can.). 
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Canadian Islamic Council. In some of these tribunals no accused 
had ever prevailed—not a single person ever—in the entire time 
of these tribunals’ existence. Complainants had a 100 percent 
success track record. Those accused of hate speech always lost. 
Now the cases against McLeans were eventually dropped, 
not least because McLeans had deep pockets and the cases were 
embarrassing all sorts of people, but not before the defendants 
had spent in excess of $2 million on that defense.24 
Or one could point to the Saskatchewan Christian 
evangelist, Bill Whatcott, who was taken before a Saskatchewan 
equivalent tribunal and fined for his publications condemning 
“sodomite” sex. The man strikes me as a quack, but I very much 
doubt he diminishes anyone’s dignity. At any rate, Whatcott 
appealed all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada, which 
earlier this year decided unanimously against him and upheld 
the constitutionality of these civil hate speech laws, laws that do 
not even make truth a defense—indeed the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Whatcott explicitly said that “truth may be used for 
widely disparate ends.”25 Whatcott vows now to continue 
speaking, which means he will be imprisoned for contempt of 
court, in theory until his will is broken, or for life. 
And there are dozens and dozens and dozens of similar 
cases from Canada—hundreds if you count the many people 
who are accused of hate speech, and who would like to fight but 
who opt on prudential grounds to make a perfunctory apology, 
pay a fine and get away. 
So just to be clear, the criminal law route for limiting hate 
speech in Canada—with its various built-in safeguards related to 
the burden of proof, to truth being a defense and to prosecutions 
needing the consent of the Attorney-General—has at a high 
level only one single successfully prosecuted case that I know of 
 
 24. This was told to me, in person, by Mark Steyn. I have no supplementary proof 
of this claim. 
 25. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11, para. 
137 (Can.). Of course it is also true that the Supreme Court of Canada read down the 
non-criminal hate speech law, severing concepts including dignity: “However, expression 
that ‘ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of’ does not rise to the level of 
ardent and extreme feelings constituting hatred required to uphold the constitutionality 
of a prohibition of expression in human rights legislation.” Id. at 18. And the Court also 
narrowed what “hatred” means, further than prior precedents, by saying it was an 
objective reasonable-person standard. In short, the Supreme Court of Canada “upheld” 
the constitutionality of a different law, with one possible implication being that the Court 
doesn’t want it used too much. 
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this past quarter century. That’s Keegstra, the one Waldron 
repeatedly refers to in this book. 
Meantime speech-restricting laws that get a near daily 
workout in Canada—laws where truth is not a defense, 
complainants get their costs paid but not the accused, just being 
offended comes close sometimes to seeming to be enough, and 
more—receive not a single mention from Waldron in this entire 
book when he looks beyond American shores to weigh up the 
costs and benefits of hate speech laws. 
Of course, it is also the case that on my reading of this book, 
given that Waldron never directly addresses the point, I would 
conclude that Waldron is probably against this whole Canadian-
style administrative law “hate speech tribunal” machinery that 
focuses in part on mere subjective offence and that does not 
make truth a defense. But I would like to have heard Waldron 
say so, to tell us whether truth ought to be a defense and all the 
rest, and to do so in no uncertain terms. 
And as a big believer, like me, in legislative sovereignty, 
Waldron might also have mentioned that Canada’s federal 
parliament is on the verge of repealing the federal non-criminal 
s.13 Human Rights Commission hate speech laws.26 Readers 
might even wonder whether the solely criminal law hate speech 
reducing Keegstra27 machinery, on its own, could ever accomplish 
anything like the volume of speech suppression that would be 
needed to make any difference at all to the sort of dignity-
enhancement that Waldron cares about—the sort of speech-
suppressing work done in Canada not by the criminal law but by 
these tribunals with all sorts of characteristics of which I infer 
Waldron disapproves. 
Or turn to Australia. The main vehicle for attempting to 
suppress hate speech there is likewise not the criminal law. And 
as it happens the current Opposition political party in their 
federal Parliament has pledged to repeal this non-criminal hate 
speech law,28 so the battle in Australia (where there is no 
 
 26. Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6, s. 13 (Can.); See Charlie 
Gillis, Section 13: How the battle for free speech was won, MACLEAN’S (June 19, 2012), 
http://www2.macleans.ca/tag/bill-c-304. The Bill to repeal it has been passed through the 
elected lower house, and on June 27th was passed through the wholly unelected and 
appointed Upper House Senate. Royal Assent is just a formality and once given the 
provision will be repealed. 
 27. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.). 
 28. See Malcolm Farnsworth, Tony Abbott Speech on Free Speech, AUSTRALIAN 
POLITICS.COM, (Aug. 6, 2012), http://australianpolitics.com/2012/08/06/tony-abbott-
speech-on-free-speech.html (Federal Opposition leader Tony Abbott addressed the 
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national bill of rights of any sort) is taking place wholly on 
Waldron’s and my preferred turf. But even if we focus on the 
courts in Australia, and on this non-criminal law machinery, we 
see that the big, notorious case involving hate speech laws there 
is the Eatock v Bolt case.29 That case involved a right-of-center 
(phew!) political pundit who commented that self-identifying 
Aborigines with mere traces of Aboriginal blood were scooping 
up too many affirmative action rewards. It is a case anyone 
familiar with the Elizabeth Warren saga in the U.S. would 
immediately recognize.30 
And the political commentator, Bolt, lost. He had to pay a 
small fine, make a pseudo-apology, remove the newspaper 
column in question from all websites, and avoid speaking on the 
same matter again. Based on the legislation the judge ruled that 
Bolt could have made his criticisms less stridently. A key pillar 
of the judge’s reasoning was that he didn’t like Bolt’s tone! 
Again, I assume that Waldron would not endorse any of 
this. But then neither does he mention any of it. And as I noted 
above, in any full-blooded consequentialist weighing up of the 
pros and cons of the sort of limited, targeted, not applying to 
mere offense, leaving truth as a defense, Waldronian-style hate 
speech laws, we will surely want to consider whether these are 
the sort of contained and bracketed laws that we will end up with 
down the road. Or whether they will transmogrify into what you 
see in the non-criminal law realm in Canada today. 
4) IS THE HATE SPEECH WALDRON CONSISTENT WITH THE 
“NO STRONG JUDICIAL REVIEW” WALDRON? 
I can be brief here. My comments are directed at the issue 
of how easy it is for Jeremy Waldron in particular (as opposed to 
someone without his skepticism of strong judicial rule) to write 
this book. I pointed out above that there is a certain sort of 
pessimism about the capacities of one’s fellow citizens to see 
through hate-mongers that runs through what is probably the 
most plausible (but still weak) account of just how it is that hate 
speech might undermine the assurance of good standing and so 
possibly require the enactment of hate speech laws. And I 
 
Institute of Public Affairs about the importance of free speech and repealing Section 
18(c) of the Racial Discrimination Act). 
 29. Eatock v Bolt (No. 2) [2011] FCA 1180 (Austl.). 
 30. Garance Franke-Ruta, Is Elizabeth Warren Native American or What?, THE 
ATLANTIC (May 20, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/is-
elizabeth-warren-native-american-or-what/257415. 
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queried whether Waldron could actually come out and openly 
say that he himself was pessimistic about his fellow citizens’ 
abilities. Or rather whether he could do that today without 
undermining some of his earlier core positions that buttressed 
his arguments against strong judicial review. 
Frankly, I am somewhat doubtful on that score, but I also 
recognize that someone of Waldron’s erudition and abilities may 
have reconciling arguments that I have yet to anticipate. So I just 
raise those doubts. 
However, related to this theme of whether Waldron has 
changed any of his earlier views, there is another passage in this 
book that seems to me to call for further clarification. Waldron 
claims that: 
I belong to a school of thought that accepts that the 
tasks assigned to courts and administrators in matters of 
fundamental rights (rights to free expression, rights to 
dignity) will often be delicate and challenging, often 
involve balancing different goods, and essaying difficult 
value judgments [with a citation to his July 2011 British 
Academy Review paper “Thoughtfulness and the Rule 
of Law” and to Ronald Dworkin’s Freedom’s Law: The 
Moral Reading of the Constitution] (pp. 115-16). 
To which I am inclined to ask, ‘Really?’ The Waldron of the 
articles cited in note 10, above, and of Moral Truth and Judicial 
Review31 and of Ego-Bloated Hovel32 and of Some Models of 
Dialogue between Judges and Legislators,33 and more again, 
accepts that there ought to be a lot of moral input at the point-
of-application of laws? Certainly on my understanding of what it 
means to be a normative legal positivist or democratic legal 
positivist (into which category I put myself and into which 
category I thought that Waldron put himself) the desire is to 
limit or minimize judges’ scope for moral and normative input at 
the point-of-application—be it for good consequentialist reasons 
(my thinking) or because you build up from non-consequentialist 
equality grounds to a “right to participate in social decision-
making,” making this your “right of rights” (which is more or 
less what I took Waldron to think). 
 
 31. 43 AM. J. JURIS. 75 (1998). 
 32. 94 NW. U.L. REV. 597 (2000). 
 33. See Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators, 
in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CHARTER ERA (Grant Huscroft & Ian Brodie eds., 
2004).  
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Of course a very careful reading of the above passage from 
the book could read the term “accepts” near the start to be an 
“is” claim rather than an endorsing “ought” claim, in which case 
Waldron might just be acknowledging the state of play in a 
world with constitutionally entrenched bills of rights as in 
Canada or the U.S.. Yet that is not the most obvious reading of 
that passage, especially given that it is made in the context of 
disavowing hate speech laws that would be “presented with rule-
like clarity, uncontroversially administrable, requiring nothing34 
in the way of further moral judgment or careful thought and 
discretion” (p. 115). 
And then there are the various hints throughout this book 
that the core goal of hate speech laws is not so much to block 
and suppress any particular set of ideas, however loathsome, but 
more to stop particularly nasty and crude articulations of those 
ideas. Yet this “just rephrase what you want to say in less 
epithet-laden terms and you can still say it” position seems to me 
to be quite precariously close to one that amounts to legislating 
in favor of intelligent people, Harvard Law School type people, 
who have the resources to frame their beliefs (however nasty) in 
terms that will pass some sort of “how did you say what you 
believe?” test. In other words, it works against the common man 
and woman. And we can even speculate on whether such a 
Waldron-mandated need to say things the proper way might not 
have the unintended and undesired effect of making certain 
detestable views more persuasive and more effective than they 
would otherwise be, by putting a clever and moderate-sounding 
new spokeswoman on an old National Front soap box, as it were. 
Who knows? 
What I think I can say, though, is that parts of the argument 
in The Harm in Hate Speech left me wondering whether 
Waldron had changed or refined or qualified any of the views 
related to his well-known anti-strong judicial review position. 
 
 34. Of course as Waldron himself has made clear in the past, no one really argues 
for no moral or normative input at the point-of-application, as that would be impossible. 
The argument is a relative one, to keep this to a bare minimum so as to increase the input 
of voters and legislators. See Jeremy Waldron, Normative (or Ethical) Positivism, in 
HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 411-33 
(Jules L. Coleman ed., 2001). 
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5) IS WALDRON’S ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH “CAUSING 
OFFENCE” AND “UNDERMINING DIGNITY” CONVINCING? 
I can be even briefer here. Despite Waldron’s erudite 
attempts to distinguish speech that merely causes offence (and 
so ought not to be silenced by law) and speech that undermines 
the dignity of the listener (which, at least potentially, ought to be 
silenced) I remained doubtful about the ability of any real-life 
hate speech law to implement this distinction. That is not just 
because Waldron at times in this book talks of the need for laws 
to protect against “being discriminated against or humiliated” 
(p. 84, inter alia) and that I cannot ultimately see how being 
humiliated is any less of a subjective issue (so not about one’s 
objective standing in society with only ancillary effects as regards 
one’s feelings) than being offended. To my mind, if dignity-
undermining differs from offence-giving then it seems to me it 
must also differ from causing humiliation. 
Nor is it just because Waldron in this book tells us he is “not 
a supporter of the proposal to ban the burqa [for liberty and 
freedom of religion reasons while, oddly, suggesting that a main 
reason for wanting the ban is the desire not to be seen by the 
world as a society of religious conservatives]” (p. 76), and I 
found myself thinking that that stance of his might be hard to 
square with his desire to have the law uphold a sort of objective 
test of being a “non-degraded member of society in good 
standing.”35 
It is also because I believe that drafting any statutory 
provision that is to be enacted in the hope of criminalizing some 
set of words that will undermine dignity but at the same time 
that will never directly or just criminalize the hurting of the 
feelings of others is beyond the wit of man. Which may or may 
not be why Waldron never offers the reader any suggested draft 
laws that show this skepticism of mine is misplaced. But I leave 
this issue wholly for the reader to decide. 
CONCLUSION 
I want to repeat that this is a thought-provoking, 
stimulating, and erudite book. At the same time I think that it 
ultimately fails to convince if you come to the book as I do, 
 
 35. Which may be why Waldron admits the burqa ban issue is “complicated” (p. 
76), and concedes that “the arguments that are used to support a burqa ban are not a 
million miles from the arguments that I am pursuing in this book” (p. 77). I would have 
put the distance somewhat closer than Waldron does. 
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someone happy to consider the various costs and benefits of 
enacting hate speech laws (however limited). In addition, the 
book would have benefitted if Waldron had seen fit to include 
even a couple of examples of hate speech emanating from 
people other than the usual suspects of neo-Nazis, skinheads, 
Islamaphobes, KKK members, cross-burners and Holocaust 
deniers that he trots out. Surely there are some examples of anti-
Semitic hate speech from Black Muslim leaders, say, that might 
have been included, or from Imams in the United Kingdom, or 
perhaps some vile speech more generally from some of today’s 
rap music or examples directed at Mormons. Anything to dispel 
the patently false lurking suggestion that dignity-diminishing 
speech comes only (or overwhelmingly) from the extremes of 
one side of politics. 
Of course in a fundamental sense I agree whole-heartedly 
with that manifestation of Waldron that argues here and there in 
this book that it should be left to elected legislators whether to 
enact hate speech laws. Indeed I prefer, too, that these laws also 
be removed by those same legislators, as has now partially taken 
place in Canada and possibly will do so in Australia after their 
next election. It is just that I disagree with Waldron that the case 
for having such laws is at all convincing or persuasive. And I say 
that despite Waldron’s efforts in this book to change the minds 
of people like me. 
Whatever the harm in hate speech, my view is that any set 
of real life hate speech laws that Waldron might have proposed 
had he seen fit to do so would either have had vanishingly few 
dignity-enhancing effects in practice or it would have rather 
massively over-reached, as in Canada. The costs would outweigh 
the benefits. 
 
